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 Simulation of the Impact of Social and
 Economic Institutions on the Size
 Distribution of Income and Wealth
 By FREDERIC L. PRYOR*
 In the vast literature on the distribution
 of income, relatively little systematic atten-
 tion has been paid to the mutual influence
 of the distributions of income and wealth
 on each other, and to the impact of inter-
 generational grants on the entire process.
 The purpose of this essay is to utilize a
 simulation model in which the distribu-
 tions of income and wealth are analyzed
 together. The model permits me to explore
 the influences of such socioeconomic vari-
 ables as the pattern of intergenerational
 grants, the rules of inheritance, the pat-
 terns of mate selection, differential fertility
 of various income classes, and the pat-
 terns of governmental redistributions of
 income and wealth. So many simplifying
 assumptions must be made that the model,
 as it is presented below, cannot be directly
 used for determining the current size dis-
 tribution of income and wealth; neverthe-
 less, the results of the model suggest cer-
 tain neglected factors, particularly the
 shape of the intergenerational savings
 function, that must be taken into account
 if we are to gain a clearer picture of the
 causal forces operating in the real world.
 The most important biases (mostly lead-
 ing to greater income equality) arising
 from the simplifying assumptions of the
 model are also discussed below.
 To take all the major long-run factors
 influencing the size distributions of income
 and wealth into account is an extremely
 complicated matter, and we face two alter-
 native research strategies; either we model
 these factors mathematically, which re-
 quires some drastic simplifications in order
 to keep the equation system solvable,' or
 we take more factors into account by
 simulating their impact. While the latter
 procedure does not lead to a completely
 general solution it does permit us to in-
 vestigate certain features of economic sys-
 tems using parameters of particular in-
 terest.
 To place this model in perspective, it is
 useful to note that variance of personal
 income can be derived from three sources;
 variances in the distribution of labor in-
 come, of property income, and of the in-
 teraction between these two variables.2 In
 this model, variations of labor income are
 handled by assigning everyone a lifetime
 income equal to the average lifetime in-
 * Professor of economics, Swarthmore College. I wish
 to thank Howard Pack, J. Roland Pennock, Frank C.
 Pierson, Zora Pryor, and George Stolnitz for their help-
 ful suggestions on an earlier draft. The research for this
 essay was financed by the International Development
 Research Center of Indiana University and was carried
 out at the Economic Growth Center of Yale Universitv.
 A considerable amount of difficult work was done by
 those who programmed this extremely complicated
 simulation model, and I would especially like to thank
 the chief programmer, Carol Hopkins. I would also like
 to express my apl)reciation to David Forman and
 Michael Hooven for assistance at particular points.
 1 Such an approach is followed by Joseph Stiglitz
 anid, in a less formal fashion, by James Meade.
 2 The higher the correlation between individual labor
 and property incomes, the more unequal the distribu-
 tion of income. (See formula in fn. I1.) The correlation
 can, of course, be negative, a situation that apparently
 arose in mandarin China where receivers of property
 income made a special point of avoiding manual work,
 even if it meant a lifetime of poverty. (See Hsiao-Tung
 lFei.)
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 come times a random variable with a mean
 of unity and a specified standard deviation.
 Variations in property income stem only
 from differential holdings of wealth; re-
 turns per unit of wealth are assumed
 equal; and, finally, no correlation is
 assumed between individual labor and
 property incomes. Thus the critical factor
 for a change in the distribution of income
 is a change in the distribution of wealth
 which, in turn, is greatly influenced by
 the different socioeconomic variables speci-
 fied below.
 I. The Basic Model3
 The simulation model starts with 100
 unmarried people with an arbitrary initial
 distribution of productive wealth. These
 people are "put to work" and both life-
 time labor and property incomes are gen-
 erated by means of a production function
 (a Cobb-Douglas function is used at first
 but a CES function is later tried) with
 assumptions of full employment and of
 mean factor payment equal to its marginal
 product. The total amount of property
 income is divided among all wealth
 holders in amounts proportionate to the
 quantity of wealth held by each; the total
 amount of labor income is distributed to
 the entire population by giving each a
 wage equal to the average wage times a
 normally distributed variable (which is
 supposed to represent a differential dis-
 tribution of abilities such as intelligence or
 diligence).
 The people in the model are then lined
 up according to income, and marriages are
 arranged according to one of three differ-
 ent rules: 1) A person can only marry
 another person next to him on the income
 scale (this is called the no-choice rule); 2)
 The chances for a person marrying anyone
 else are equal (the equal-choice rule); 3) A
 person can marry anyone but the chances
 are greater if the two are closer to each
 other on the income distribution (the
 limited-choice rule).'
 The government can then step in and
 redistribute income (either progressively or
 regressively). This is followed by the ac-
 cumulation or disposal of family wealth
 (positive or negative savings) so that a
 specified ratio of family wealth to family
 income is achieved; this intergenerational
 savings function is discussed in detail
 below. Asimplifying assumption used in the
 model is that all wealth and net changes in
 wealth (net savings or dis-savings) are in
 the form of productive capital which yield
 property income.
 At this point the various families have
 children according to their income in the
 following manner: First, the families are
 divided into three groups according to
 whether they are among those with the
 highest family incomes, lowest incomes, or
 in-between. (The percentage of families
 falling in each group can be varied.) Then
 the number of children are specified for
 each group, for example, the rich can be
 designated to have more or fewer children
 than the poor (or vice versa). Polygynous
 situations can be approximated by specify-
 ing many children for the rich and no
 children for the poor, since in such societies
 it is well known that only the wealthier can
 afford to support many wives and the low
 income men often do not marry.
 The parents are then removed from the
 scene and family wealth is divided among
 3The model rests on the pioneering work of Guy
 Orcutt. Other simulation models of income distribution
 have been made (for example, Hans-Juergen Krupp),
 but these are considerably different than mine and,
 moreover, have focused primarily on short-run prob-
 lems.
 4The probabilities of one person marrying another is,
 of course, changed when a couple is married and re-
 moved from the pool of eligibles. Therefore, the state-
 ments in the text must be considered as just approxi-
 mately true. For the limited-choice model, the probabil-
 ity of marriage is inversely proportional to the differ-
 ence in income rank between the two individuals. The
 calculations are simplified by not designating the sex of
 the individuals so that marriages b)etween any two
 individuals may be possible.
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 the children according to one of three
 different rules: 1) One child can receive
 everything (the primogeniture rule) ;5 2)
 The property can be divided equally
 among all children (the equal-division
 rule); 3) The first child can receive half of
 the wealth and the remainder is divided
 equally among the rest (the compromise
 rule). At this point the government can
 also redistribute wealth (a type of inheri-
 tance tax). We now have a group of people
 with a given distribution of wealth of
 productive capital whom we put to work;
 the process is repeated many times to see
 if a stable distribution of income and
 wealth is achieved.
 With only a few exceptions (discussed
 below) the processes converge toward an
 "equilibrium distribution" which, when
 attained, is maintained for all succeeding
 generations. In certain cases, however, the
 process is extremely slow and in order to
 avoid inordinate computer expenses, the
 following procedure was adopted. In every
 case the simulation was carried out twice,
 once starting from a highly unequal initial
 distribution of wealth (where the wealthiest
 10 percent of individuals share the total
 societal wealth in equal portions) and once
 starting from a relatively equal wealth dis-
 tribution (where the wealthiest 75 percent
 of individuals share in equal amounts the
 total wealth). Each simulation is then run
 for 30 generations (which represents 1000
 years if a generation is calculated as 334
 years, or 750 years if a generation is 25
 years) and the end results of the simula-
 tions starting from different points are
 averaged; in almost all cases the two esti-
 mates were very similar to each other.
 In the tables I use Gini coefficients as a
 measure of this inequality of the equi-
 librium size distribution of lifetime in-
 come. Gini coefficients are measured by
 calculating Lorenz curves and measuring
 the ratio between the "area of inequality"
 and the total income triangle (the coeffi-
 cient ranges from 0.00, which represents
 total equality to 1.00, which represents
 total inequality). I have computed four
 other statistical measures of inequality but
 space does not permit their inclusion. In
 certain cases where it is useful to discuss
 relative speeds of convergence, the period
 is measured from the starting point to the
 point when an equilibrium Gini coefficient
 is achieved (plus or minus a small
 amounlt) .6
 Before the numerical results are pre-
 sented, certain features of the model may
 perhaps be better understood if we exa-
 mine in a qualitative fashion the effect of
 particular variables.
 A. The Simplest Patterns
 If we take a situation where every
 family, regardless of income, has two chil-
 dren; where there is no variation in labor
 income (the random factor is not yet in-
 troduced); and where families do not add
 to, or decrease, their inherited wealth
 (i.e., family wealth is passed on unchanged
 regardless of income, a situation occurring
 when land is the basic source of wealth and
 is not alienable), the observed patterns of
 convergence of the distribution of wealth
 are quite simple and are outlined in Table
 1 below.
 With primogeniture wealth accumulates
 eventually into a single hand.7 TIhe speed
 of convergence is inversely proportional to
 the degree to which people choose marriage
 partners in other income brackets. With
 5 I have used an extreme form of primogeniture in
 which the first child, regardless of sex, obtains the entire
 family's wealth. This variant of primogeniture leads to
 the most extreme wealth-holding inequalities and, in
 addition, is computationallv simpler in that sexes do
 not need to be assigned to particular individuals for
 the model to work. A more usual case of primogeniture
 is, of course, when only the eldest son obtains the
 entire estate.
 6 The exact method employed is described in the
 Appendix.
 I If the eldest son variant of primiiogeniture is used,
 then, of course, this extreme result wN ill not obtaini.
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 TABLE 1-BASIC EQUILIBRIUM PATTERNS OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH
 Marriage rules
 Inheritance rules No-choice rule Limited-choice rule Equal-choice rule
 Primogeniture Wealth concentrates to a single Same as no-choice rule, Same as no-choice rule, but con-
 owner; fast convergence. but convergence is slower. vergence is slower than other
 primogeniture situations.
 Equal division Wealth distribution remains Wealth becomes evenly dis- Wealth becomes evenly dis-
 the same as starting position. tributed but convergence is tributed; convergence is faster
 slow. than with limited-choice rule.
 equal division of inherited property and
 with everyone marrying a person next to
 him on the income distribution, it should
 be readily apparent that no change will
 occur in the size distribution of income and
 wealth, as long as all families continue to
 have two children. In the other two cases
 with equal division of inherited property,
 wealth eventually becomes completely
 equally distributed.
 The compromise rule of inheritance,
 where the first child received half of the
 property and the remainder is divided
 equally among the other children, is the
 same as the equal-division rule (under the
 assumption of two-child families).
 The speed of conversion to equilibrium
 depends, of course, on the distribution of
 wealth at the starting point and at
 equilibrium. Starting from a highly un-
 equal distribution of income, convergence
 is achieved in the primogeniture case in
 three to five generations; starting from the
 more equal distribution of wealth, con-
 vergence takes six to fifteen generations.
 For the equal-division cases where con-
 vergence occurs, the process generally
 takes somewhat longer. Although con-
 vergence speeds in the above examples ap-
 pear to have little economic meaning, they
 become important when governmental
 policy measures are introduced (i.e., re-
 distribution of income and/or wealth) and
 certain goals of income distribution are set.
 B. The Impact of a Random Variable
 Representing Abilities
 If we now introduce a random variable
 representing differential abilities so that
 labor incomes are the product of the aver-
 age wage times a random variable (with a
 mean of unity), the basic patterns are
 modified in the following ways:
 1) The greater the variation in the
 random element, the more unequal the
 equilibrium income distribution in those
 five cases in Table 1 where convergence is
 observed. This is because greater ex-
 tremes in labor income are generated.
 2) In situations where people are al-
 lowed choice in marriage partners, the
 convergence process is speeded up where
 there is an equal division inheritance rule
 and slowed down where there is primogeni-
 ture. This stems from the fact that there
 is a greater mixing of people of different
 wealth at the time of marriage (since the
 marriage rules are based on total income,
 not wealth alone). Where people marry
 those next to them on the income scale, a
 complication arises which is discussed
 below.
 One important methodological point
 also arises. Introduction of a random ele-
 ment raises difficulties in determining the
 exact equilibrium distribution of income.
 In interpreting the various tables pre-
 sented below, small differences in the co-
 efficients should be overlooked and, al-
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 though data are presented to three places,
 variations of several percent or less should
 usually be neglected.
 Throughout the remaining simulations
 the random factor is set with a standard
 deviation of 15 percent, which is roughly
 similar to the variation of I.Q. test scores.
 C. The Impact of Differential
 Fertility Rates
 In all cases primogeniture leads to a
 highly unequal income distribution since,
 whatever the fertility pattern, only one
 child receives all the property. Similarly,
 in all cases where the rich have only one
 child (which leads automatically to primo-
 geniture) a highly unequal equilibrium
 income distribution is also generated.
 In nonprimogeniture cases, fertility
 affects the end results considerably. In
 cases where fertility increases with income,
 the system should converge relatively
 quickly to fairly even distributions. (Such
 a situation allegedly occurred in past eras
 in oriental despotic societies where the
 rulers encouraged polygyny so that the
 rich would have a much higher fertility
 rate than other classes and, at the same
 time, forbade primogeniture; the end re-
 sult was supposed to be an economy with a
 relatively even distribution of income and
 no independent bases of wealth with
 which to challenge royal authority.)8
 Simulation results of different patterns
 of fertility among the income classes are
 presented in Appendix Table 1. For
 simplicity, in the rest of the paper, I
 assume that fertility is the same in all
 income classes unless otherwise specified.
 II. Quantitative Results: No Saving;
 Stationary Population; No
 Technological Change
 We are now ready to begin the quantita-
 tive investigation. In Table 2 below, the
 results for the most simple situation with
 different marriage and inheritance rules
 are presented. There is no accumulation of
 wealth for the society as a whole and each
 family passes on only that wealth which it
 inherits.
 TABLE 2-GINI COEFFICIENTS OF EQuILIBRIUM INCOME
 DISTRIBUTION ASSUMING DIFFERENT MARRIAGE
 AND INHERITANCE RULES
 Marriage Rules
 Inheritanice No- Limited- Equal-
 Rules Choice Choice Choice
 Primogeniture .307 .308 .297
 Compromise a .064 .060
 Equal Division a .064 .060
 Assutmptions: No net family capital formation; no cap-
 ital or income redistribution; all families have two chil-
 dren; standard deviation of the random element is .15;
 labor share of national income is 75 percent.
 a If the system starts from a highly unequal distribu-
 tion of wealth, the equilibrium distribution of income is
 equal to its original value. If the system starts from a
 relatively equal wealth distribution where high ability
 people with no property might marry low ability people
 with property (since they would be next to each other on
 the income scale), then the equilibrium income distribu-
 tion would be highly equal.
 As expected, the inequality of income is
 higher with primogeniture than with the
 compromise or equal division inheritance
 rules (which give the same answers be-
 cause each family has only two children).
 As we also expect, the equilibrium income
 distribution does not seem greatly af-
 fected by the marriage rules; in this simple
 model the major effect of the marriage
 rules appears on the speed at which
 equilibrium is achieved. Only in much
 more complicated models do the marriage
 rules appear to have much impact on the
 equilibrium size distribution of income.
 One puzzling phenomenon appears in the
 primogeniture case where the other mea-
 sures of inequality give somewhat different
 results but this is due most likely to a
 change in the shape of the distribution of
 income, with slightly increasing inequality
 at the high income end and slightly de- 8 Such systems are analyzed by K. Wittfogel.
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 creasing inequality at the middle and
 lower income levels. This particular result
 does not appear due to random factors
 since equilibrium was achieved from all
 starting points of the simulation and the
 various results given particular marriage
 and inheritance rules were very similar.
 In the simulation model a wealth redis-
 tribution process can be set up so that all
 inherited wealth is taxed a given per-
 centage and then the total amount of
 taxed wealth is distributed equally among
 all individuals. If the tax rate is positive,
 then such a process is progressive because
 the least wealthy end up with a net gain in
 wealth while the most wealthy end up with
 a net loss. This manner of specifying a
 capital tax on inherited wealth allows the
 total amount of privately held wealth to
 remain constant.
 The results of imposing a capital re-
 distribution tax are presented in Table 3
 and can be summarized quite easily: The
 greater the redistribution of wealth, the
 more equal the equilibrium distribution
 of income and wealth. This, of course, is
 not surprising. The equilibrium income dis-
 tributions are most unequal for the primo-
 geniture cases and most equal when family
 property is evenly distributed among
 heirs, a result similar to the previous find-
 ings. The marriage rules again have a rela-
 tively small impact. It must be noted that
 with very high redistributions of wealth,
 the differences in the equilibrium distribu-
 tions with the various marriage and in-
 heritance rules are relatively small; it
 appears that after a certain point, the
 redistribution swamps the effects of other
 institutions.
 Since the redistribution of wealth can
 be a deliberate tool of governmental policy,
 the rate of convergence to the equilibrium
 income distribution is of considerable in-
 terest. Several generalizations can be
 made: First, imposition of a redistribution
 of wealth greatly increases the speed of
 convergence and in almost all cases con-
 vergence is achieved within five genera-
 tions (with the major portion of the
 changes occurring in the first two genera-
 tions). Second, convergence appears to be
 faster when the model is started with rela-
 tively more unequal wealth distribution
 TABLE 3-GINI COEFFICIENTS OF EQUILIBRIUM INCOME DISTRIBUTION
 WITH DIFFERENT REDISTRIBUTIONS OF WEALTH
 Marriage Rules
 Redistribution and
 inheritance rules No-Choice Limited-Choice Equal-Choice
 No redistribution of wealth
 Primogeniture .307 .308 .297
 Equal division a .064 .060
 30 percent redistribution of wealth
 Primogeniture .156 .158 .148
 Equal division .061 .063 .063
 60 percent redistribution of wealth
 Primogeniture .088 .091 .089
 Equal division .062 .062 .064
 90 percent redistribution of wealth
 Primogeniture .061 .066 .064
 Equal division .062 .062 .062
 Assumptions: see Table 2
 a See fn. a, Table 2
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 than with a relatively more equal wealth
 distribution. In other words, achieving a
 more equal distribution of income by
 means of a redistribution of wealth can be
 carried out more quickly in those cases
 where the differences between actual and
 desired distributions are greatest.
 Introducing a redistributive income tax
 changes, of course, the equilibrium income
 distribution. In this case wealth is not
 affected; and since marriages are arranged
 according to relative income, this part of
 the system is not affected either. Under the
 assumptions in this section about no-net
 intergenerational accumulations of family
 capital, the speed of convergence toward
 the equilibrium income distribution should
 not be affected. However, once we allow
 net intergenerational accumulation of capi-
 tal based on family income, then an in-
 come redistribution could have a number
 of effects on total savings, growth, and
 convergence and provides a much more
 interesting problem for analysis. Discus-
 sion of the effects of a redistributive in-
 come tax is therefore deferred until the
 rigid assumption about the integenera-
 tional transfer function is loosened.
 III. Quantitative Results: Introduction
 of an Intergenerational
 Savings Function
 Let us now allow the capital stock to
 change, while still keeping the total popu-
 lation constant, so that we can isolate some
 of the effects of different patterns of in-
 tergenerational savings and transfers. One
 of the most important results of the simu-
 lation exercise is to show that the shape of
 this function has crucial importance on the
 equilibrium income distribution. Before
 turning to the results, however, several
 theoretical questions deserve brief exami-
 nation.
 First we must inquire about the nature
 of the integenerational transfer function.
 Up to now this has been a terra incognita
 in the economic literature: empirical data
 with which to derive such a function are
 unavailable and theorists who insist on
 deducing propositions about consumer be-
 havior from the neoclassical axioms of
 rational choice have not been able to say
 anything about the matter. One reasonable
 assumption, which is reflected in numer-
 ous obiter dicta on the subject, is that the
 amount of wealth passed on by a husband
 and wife to their children is primarily a
 function of lifetime family income and it
 is on this basis that the model is changed
 below. The shape of the function is still
 problematical and experiments are carried
 out with several different formulae.
 Second, once we introduce changes in
 the net capital stock, a problem arises be-
 cause we must also take into consideration
 the possibility of multiple stable growth
 paths;9 thus the initial conditions of the
 system and the way in which the inter-
 generational transfer function are specified
 become quite important. In order to avoid
 such complications, care was exercised in
 designing the intergenerational transfer
 function so that only a single stable growth
 path, independent of the initial conditions,
 would be achieved. A number of tests were
 also made with different initial conditions
 (different initial capital stocks) in order to
 insure the correctness of the specification.
 A third problem arises in the choice of
 the production function, i.e., the function
 showing the relationship between the
 capital and labor in the system and total
 production. All production functions used
 below exhibit diminishing returns to varia-
 tions in the capital-labor ratio. This
 means, among other things, that the ratio
 of capital to labor asymptotically ap-
 proaches a limit which represents a
 "steady-state equilibrium" where depre-
 ciation just equals gross savings and net
 9 This problem is analyzed in an abstract but lucid
 manner by Stiglitz.
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 capital formation is zero. Such diminishing
 returns can, however, be offset by tech-
 nological change so that in "steady-state
 growth" production, the capital stock and
 the ratio of capital to labor rise at the
 same rate of growth. In this particular
 case (Harrod-neutral growth), labor pro-
 ductivity (the ratio of output to the con-
 stant labor force) also rises at the same
 rate while capital productivity asymptoti-
 cally approaches a constant.
 One last precautionary note must be
 added. Although the analysis below focuses
 almost exclusively on income distribution,
 it must be emphasized that the various
 types of intergenerational transfer func-
 tions, production functions, and redistribu-
 tions of wealth and income lead to quite
 different equilibrium levels of production.
 Although there are a number of proposi-
 tions in the economic literature linking the
 inequality of income to the growth rate of
 production (for example, the more un-
 equal the distribution of income, the
 greater the aggregate production), the re-
 sults below show exceptions to such gen-
 eralizations. For those interested in pursu-
 ing the relationship between income dis-
 tribution, the savings function and growth,
 some data on steady-state production
 equilibria are given in Appendix Tables
 2, 4, and 6.
 A. The Impact of Linear and Non-Linear
 Intergenerational Transfer Functions
 Two types of integernerational transfer
 functions are used in the analysis below.
 The first is a simple linear function where
 intergenerational transfers of a particular
 family are a proportion of lifetime income:
 S= Yz where S= intergenerational trans-
 fers; Y= family lifetime income; and z is
 the "savings constant" to be specified. If
 family income is low and inherited wealth
 is great, the intergenerational transfer
 (proportionate to income) might be less
 than the original inherited wealth, i.e., the
 family has "dipped into capital." A second
 type of intergenerational transfer function
 has a kink in it and is thus non-linear; such
 transfers are a function of income over and
 above some socially determined "sub-
 sistence level," below which no inter-
 generational transfers are made (i.e., the
 family doesn't pass on inherited wealth).
 Since negative intergenerational transfers
 (i.e., debts) are not permitted (although
 dipping into capital is allowed), the kink
 of the savings function occurs at Y. The
 simple form selected for this non-linear
 function is S=(Y-Y)z, S>O.
 A brief digression is necessary to clear
 up certain ambiguities of this subsistence
 level. First, this is not necessarily the bio-
 logical subsistence level nor does there
 need to be any explicit societal recognition
 that such a subsistance level actually
 exists. Rather, it is merely the income
 level below which families feel they must
 spend all of their funds for consumption
 in order to try to achieve a certain stan-
 dard of living and as a result, they do not
 have any wealth left over to pass on to
 succeeding generations. If per capita in-
 come in the society rises and the socially
 determined subsistence level remains sta-
 tionary, this subsistence level may even-
 tually become such a small proportion of
 individual family income that the savings
 function is, for all intents and purposes,
 linear, i.e., the performance of the system
 asympototically approaches that of a sys-
 tem with an intergenerational transfer
 function of S= Yz. On the other hand, the
 socially determined subsistence level can
 also rise as society views on an adequate
 standard of living rise. Since this might be
 a reasonable approximation of reality, it is
 useful to tie the subsistence income to the
 rise in per capita income. For simplicity, I
 have set the subsistence income always
 equal to average per capita income which
 means that when a non-linear intergenera-
 tional transfer function is used, only those
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 TABLE 4-GINI COEFFICIENTS OF EQUILIBRIUM INCOME DISTRIBUTION ASSUMING
 DIFFERENT INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFER FUNCTIONS
 Marriage Rules
 Transfer functions and
 inheritance rules No-Choice Limited-Choice Equal-Choice
 S= Yz
 Z=1.5
 Primogeniture .165 .165 .161
 Equal division .069 .067 .060
 z = 2.0
 Primogeniture .167 .169 .162
 Equal division .066 .066 .063
 z=2.5
 Primogeniture . 165 . 170 . 164
 Equal division .065 .063 .062
 S= (Y-Yf)Z
 z = 2.0
 Primogeniture .306 .301 .300
 Equal division .293 .266 .206
 z = 2.5
 Primogeniture .308 .309 .306
 Equal division .296 .260 . 199
 Assum?lptions: All families have two children; standard deviation of random element is
 .15; labor share of national income is 75 percent; no income or capital redistributions;
 no technical change; no negative transfers.
 Note: S = intergenerational transfers; Y = personal incomes; V = average income;
 z =a constant.
 families with incomes above the average
 pass on wealth to the succeeding genera-
 tion. Finally, it must be noted that the
 socially determined subsistence level can
 rise faster than average income and in this
 strange case with such a strong "demon-
 stration effect," families might dip into
 capital (as long as they did not run into
 debt) until little capital would be left in
 the society as the subsistence level ap-
 proaches the highest family incomes.
 Experiments were also made with a
 third form of the intergenerational transfer
 functions: S== W+ Yz, where W is the
 wealth inherited by the mother and father
 of the family from their parents. This
 function implies that the wealth inherited
 by the children is always greater than the
 wealth inherited by the parents, no matter
 how low the family income might be be-
 cause of the low labor incomes received by
 the parents. Such a situation does not
 seem very realistic and these experiments
 were abandoned. The results of simula-
 tion experiments using both linear and
 non-linear intergenerational transfer func-
 tions for several different parameters of the
 savings coefficient (z) are presented in
 Table 4 above.10
 The non-linear transfer function leads,
 1I If the capital-output ratio is greater than unitv, the
 average - coefficient must be greater than unitv or there
 must be a multiplicative constant in the production
 function if the capital stock in the economy is to be
 maintained. In the results reported in Table 4, z is
 placed larger than unity. If a multiplicative constant
 were used in the production function, z could be made
 less than unity (which, of course, makes more "real
 life" sense) but the results would be the same.
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 as one might expect, to a much greater in-
 equality of income than the linear func-
 tion; for in the former case, only the richer
 segments of the population pass on wealth
 to their children and this, in turn, concen-
 trates wealth and property income. With
 a simple linear transfer function, the
 height of the savings coefficient (z) does
 not appear to affect the inequality of the
 equilibrium income distribution (the dif-
 ferences do not appear statistically sig-
 nificant) although, of course, a higher z
 leads to a higher steady-state production
 level. On the other hand, a higher savings
 coefficient does seem to affect the degree
 of income inequality when a non-linear
 function is used, although the direction of
 the effect depends upon the particular
 measure of inequality that is chosen and
 the inheritance rule that is followed.
 With the introduction of intergenera-
 tional transfer functions based on income,
 we now have a situation where the mar-
 riage rules have a more important impact
 on the equilibrium income distribution
 than in the previous section where capital
 was passed on regardless of income. With
 primogeniture the effect of the marriage
 rules is small in almost all cases except
 with one nonreported inequality measure.
 On the other hand, with equal division of
 property, especially with a non-linear trans-
 fer function, the inequality of the equilib-
 rium income distribution decreases as
 the marriage rules change toward equal
 choice.
 Generalizing about the relationsips be-
 tween equilibrium income distribution, in-
 heritance rules, and transfer functions is
 more difficult. With a linear intergenera-
 tional transfer function, primogeniture
 leads to a more unequal distribution of
 personal income than other inheritance
 rules. With a non-linear transfer function,
 the results depend upon the measure of in-
 equality chosen since the relationships be-
 tween different parts of the income dis-
 tribution are differentially affected. Thus
 no generalization is possible.
 TIo summarize, with a linear transfer
 function where families at all income levels
 pass on wealth to the succeeding genera-
 tion, the primary influence on the equilib-
 rium distribution of income is the inheri-
 tance rules; and marriage rules or the
 height of the savings constant (z) have
 little effect. With a non-linear intergenera-
 tional transfer function, the equilibrium
 income distribution is affected by the
 marriage rules, the inheritance rules, and
 the height of the savings constant. Gen-
 eralizations in these latter cases are difficult
 because the overall inequality and the shape
 of income distribution curve change simul-
 taneously.
 B. The Impact of Income and
 Capital Redistributions
 A redistribution of capital in each
 generation not only affects the distribution
 of income but also, in the case of a non-
 linear intergenerational transfer function,
 the growth of the system. (This is because
 the share of income over the subsistence
 level is a smaller ratio of total income
 after a redistribution). The effect on the
 equilibrium distribution of income should
 increase with the severity of the redistribu-
 tion and, one might suspect, would greatly
 affect the equilibrium distribution in the
 case of a non-linear, rather than a linear,
 transfer function. Relevant data are pre-
 sented in Table S below which supports
 these conjectures.
 An X percent redistribution of income in
 each generation should have a greater
 impact on the equilibrium distribution of
 income than an X percent redistribution of
 wealth because in the latter case only one
 source of income inequality is being
 changed. This differential impact of an in-
 come redistribution should also be greater
 in the case of a non-linear intergenerational
 savings function because the effect on the
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 TABLE 5-GINI COEFFICIENTS OF EQUILIBRIUM INCOM&E DISTRIBUTION
 WITH DIFFERENT CAPITAL REDISTRIBUTIONS
 Marriage Rules
 Redistribution taxes and
 inheritance rules No-Choice Linmited-Choice Equal-Choice
 S =Yz, (z= 2.0)
 No redistribution
 Primogeniture .167 .169 .162
 Equal division .066 .066 .063
 30 percent capital redistribution
 Primogeniture .121 .120 .123
 Equal division .061 .060 .060
 6() percent capital redistribution
 Primogeniture .086 .081 .087
 Equal division .063 .064 .063
 90 percent capital redistribution
 Primogeniture .065 .064 .064
 Equal division .062 .062 .062
 S=(Y-Y)z, (z=2.0)
 No redistribution
 Primogeniture .306 .301 .300
 Equal division .293 .266 .206
 30 percent capital redistribution
 Primogeniture .233 .229 .226
 Equal division .220 . 190 . 126
 60 percent capital redistribution
 Primogeniture .144 .145 .133
 Equal division .134 .103 .089
 90 percent capital redistribution
 Primogeniture .069 .070 .068
 Equal division .063 .062 .064
 Assumitptions: See Table 4
 share of income over the subsistence level
 vis-a-vis the total national income would
 be greater. And finally, the effect of an
 income distribution should increase with
 the extent of the redistribution and (using
 the same arguments employed in the case
 of the capital redistribution) should affect
 the equilibrium distribution more in the
 case of the non-linear than of the linear
 transfer function. These conjectures re-
 ceive support in the data presented in
 Tables 5 and 6 although certain ex-
 ceptions do arise, especially when other
 inequality measures are used. Although the
 underlying reasons for these exceptions are
 obscure, part of the difficulty may lie in the
 changing shape of the income distribution
 curve that accompanies the overall
 changes in equilibrium inequality.
 Again, we observe the fact that conver-
 gence to the equilibrium income distribu-
 tion is very much speeded up with the
 imposition of either a redistribution of in-
 come or wealth tax program. Again, con-
 vergence is achieved usually in a few gen-
 erations although the parameters of the
 equilibrium are somewhat different than
 those discussed in Section II.
 Since these income or capital taxes may
 serve as deliberate policy tools by the
 government to achieve particular income
 distribution goals, we must turn briefly to
 the convergence properties of the system.
 In the case of the linear intergenerational
 transfer functions, the situation is very
 similar to the case where there was no net
 capital formation in each family and con-
 vergence occurs very rapidly, usually in
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 TABLE 6-GINI COEFFICIENTS OF EQuILIBRIUM INCOME DISTRIBUJTION
 WITH DIFFERENT INCOME REDISTRIBUTIONS
 Marriage Rules
 Redistribution taxes and
 inheritance rules No-Choice Limited-Choice Equal-Choice
 S= Yz, (z= 2.0)
 No redistribution
 Primogeniture .167 .169 .162
 Equal division .066 .066 .063
 30 percent income redistribution
 Primogeniture .112 .115 .112
 Equal division .046 .044 .043
 60 percent income redistribution
 Primogeniture .062 .064 .062
 Equal division .024 .026 .024
 90 percent income redistribution
 Primogeniture .015 .016 .015
 Equal division .006 .006 .006
 S = (Y-Y)z, (z= 2.0)
 No redistribution
 Primogeniture .306 .301 .300
 Equal division .293 .266 .206
 30 percent income redistribution
 Primogeniture .216 .215 .212
 Equal division .202 .176 .130
 60 percent income redistribution
 Primogeniture .124 .123 .121
 Equal division .118 .105 .064
 90 percent income redistribution
 Primogeniture .031 .031 .030
 Equal division .029 .026 .019
 Ass,umptions: See Table 4
 several generations. In the case of the
 non-linear intergenerational transfer func-
 tion, the system approaches the equilib-
 rium distribution equally rapidly; but in
 the wealth redistributions, the Gini co-
 efficient of income inequality often cycles
 around the equilibrium value several
 times, rather than asymptotically ap-
 proaching it.
 Since the greatest changes in income
 equality brought about by the income or
 wealth redistribution occur in the first
 generation and since differences between
 the actual degree of income inequality and
 the equilibrium value are quite small after
 a few generations, one lesson seems clear:
 other things being equal, redistribution
 taxes appear an efficient method of chang-
 ing the degree of income inequality in a
 nation. (One condition in the ceteris
 paribus clause is that such taxes do not
 have adverse effects on productivity.) Al-
 though radicals may be unwilling to wait a
 generation for the major effects to take
 place and prefer instead a revolution to
 accomplish redistribution aims, the de-
 struction of capital and confusion follow-
 ing such events might lead to a situation
 where average income would be consider-
 ably lower and income not much more
 equally distributed than if mundane and
 undramatic redistributional taxes had
 been used instead.
 C. The Impact of the Elasticity
 of Substitution
 Up to now the results are based on a
 Cobb-Douglas prodtuction function which
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 has an elasticity of substitution of unity.
 Since we have growth in the system, this
 assumption may have some impact on the
 results and a series of simulations were run
 using the CES function that has been ex-
 plored by Kenneth Arrow et al.11
 Summarizing the results in a capsule
 form is extremely difficult for a number of
 counteracting factors influenced the re-
 sults: further, the results feature a number
 of small puzzles which are difficult to ex-
 plain. For those wishing to explore these
 matters further, the results are presented
 in Appendix Tables 3 and 4.
 IV. Quantitative Results: Introduction
 of Certain Dynamic Factors
 A. The Impact of Harrod-Neutral
 Technological Change
 If we introduce technological change
 such that the production arising from a
 given capital and labor stock is multiplied
 by an exponentially growing factor, per
 capita income grows, the capital stock
 grows (because savings increase), and
 eventually the system achieves a steady-
 state growth path. Using a Cobb-Douglas
 production function, factor income shares
 remain the same.
 The results of the simulations can be
 easily summarized: the equilibrium income
 distributions do not seem greatly affected
 by the introduction of Harrod-neutral
 technical change. (Indeed, the only notice-
 able effects occur with the non-linear
 transfer function and these are relatively
 small.) Undoubtedly other types of tech-
 nological change would complicate the
 results, but exploration of these matters
 must be left for future research. Results
 of the experiments with Harrod-neutral
 change are presented in Appendix Table 5.
 B. The Impact of Population Change
 If we now add to the analysis population
 growth which can arise from many differ-
 ent patterns of differential fertility, a large
 number of cases are open to explore.
 Simplification can be achieved once we
 realize that introduction of population
 change has two major effects: it raises the
 absolute value of total production; and it
 allows different rates of growth of the
 capital-labor ratio to occur through
 changes in the denominator of the frac-
 tion, rather than the numerator. Rather
 than multiply examples endlessly, it seems
 most useful to examine only several simple
 patterns of fertility in order to show how
 the system works. One financial constraint
 on this process of analysis must also be
 mentioned: the greater the number of
 people in the system, the more expensive
 the simulation becomes. To obtain the re-
 sults reported in Table 7, I started the
 system with only fifty people; introduced a
 10 percent population growth (per gen-
 eration) and ran the system for only
 twenty-five generations. This led to an
 eightfold increase in population and, as a
 result, almost a quadrupling of computer
 cost. (It must also be noted that in order
 to limit population growth, "poor" and
 "rich" families are defined as the 20 per-
 cent of families on either end of the in-
 come distribution, while the "middle class"
 is the remaining 60 percent; this is slightly
 different than the income definitions used
 in calculating Appendix Table 1 below.)
 Equilibrium gross national products are
 presented in Appendix Table 6.
 The most surprising result appears
 where the transfer function is linear: here
 differential fertility appears to have rela-
 tively little impact on the equilibrium dis-
 tribution of income, a result which is some-
 what different from the situation in Ap-
 pendix Table 1 where no net capital forma-
 tion takes place. In the case of the non-
 linear transfer function, on the other
 hand, the expected impact of differential
 fertility can be observed in nonprimo-
 geniture situations, i.e., the equilibrium
 11 See Arrow et al. For the derivation of factor shares
 I used the simple formulae derived by R. G. D. Allen.
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 TABLE 7-GINI COEFFICIENTS OF EQUILIBRIUM INCOME DISTRIBUTION
 WITH POPULATION CHANGE AND DIFFERENT FERTILITY PATTERNS
 Marriage Rules
 No-Choice Limited-Choice Equal-Choice
 S =Yz, (z =2.0)
 Number of children
 Rich M.C. Poor
 2 2 2
 Primogeniture .167 .169 .162
 Compromise .066 .066 .063
 Equal division .066 .066 .063
 3 2 2
 Promogeniture .082 .178 .175
 Compromise .071 .068 .071
 Equal division .065 .069 .066
 2 2 3
 Primogeniture .182 .176 .175
 Compromise .075 .076 .073
 Equal division .074 .073 .072
 S=(Y-Y)z, (z=2.0)
 2 2 2
 Primogeniture .306 .301 .300
 Compromise .293 .266 .206
 Equal division .293 .266 .206
 3 2 2
 Primogeniture .314 .313 .309
 Compromise .273 .253 .169
 Equal division .230 . 185 .127
 2 2 3
 Primogeniture .312 .313 .310
 Compromise .309 .296 .194
 Equal division .306 .294 .219
 Assutmiiptions: Standard deviation of random element is .15; Cobb-Douglas production
 function with labor share of national income as 75 percent; no technological change; no
 income or capital redistribution; no negative transfers.
 distribution appears more equal, the
 greater the number of children of the rich
 vis-a-vis other groups in the population.
 It should also be noted that population
 growth gives rise to a somewhat more un-
 equal equilibrium distribution of income
 than with no population growth and it
 seems likely that this effect would be
 greater if population growth were higher.
 This may be tied up with the results that
 with population growth, the equilibrium
 per capita income and the equilibrium
 capital-labor ratio are somewhat lower
 which, as a result, means that returns per
 unit of capital are higher and returns per
 unit of labor are lower. The exact interac-
 tion of these various factors is, however,
 complex. 12
 12 Some insight can be gained into these matters by
 starting from the well-known formulas for the separation
 of the components of variance;
 Var(Y) =Var(P)+Var(W)+2 Cov(P, W)
 and Var(P)> i2 Var (k) +lk2 Var(i)-+2ikCov(i, k)
 (over)
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 V. Application of the Model
 Given the assumptions of the model, the
 numerical results obtained in the simula-
 tions cannot be directly applied to avail-
 able data on the distribution of income.
 Certain biases resulting from the assump-
 tions require special attention.
 First, the model assumes that labor in-
 come of an individual is not positively cor-
 related with his parents' income. Since it
 is generally believed that there is, indeed,
 a positive correlation, this means that the
 results presented above have a bias toward
 equality. In future simulations this fact
 could be built in the model either directly
 (a procedure which would require con-
 siderably more memory capacity of a
 computer than the program used in this
 study) or by using a different type of
 intergenerational savings function in which
 a fraction of the parents' income would be
 considered human capital transmitted to
 the children.
 Second, the model assumes that labor
 income and property income are not posi-
 tively correlated. Although data have not
 been published in a useable form empiri-
 cally to investigate such matters, I
 strongly suspect that in the United States
 there is a positive correlation. Certainly
 those occupying important positions to
 which high labor incomes accrue are in a
 better position to invest their money in
 investments yielding high returns; further,
 the existence of great wealth often permits
 people to obtain positions yielding high
 labor incomes. If this correlation between
 labor and property income is positive, then
 the empirical results obtained with the
 simulation model show a greater income
 equality than actually exists. Repairing
 this fault in the model would not be
 difficult: labor income could be made a
 function of the random variable plus a
 given fraction of wealth.
 Third, for technical reasons labor in-
 comes in the model were bounded by
 limits of .5 and 1.5 of the average income,
 and since capital accumulation is a func-
 tion of total income, certain limits are
 placed on the amount of capital accumula-
 tion that one individual can carry out.
 Since this does not permit the existence of
 a Henry Ford, a J. Paul Getty, or a John
 D. Rockefeller, who manage to accumu-
 late enormous sums within a single life-
 time, the results of the simulation model
 show a bias toward equality. This might
 be repaired in the model by designating
 one person in each generation who is
 destined to strike it rich at the expense of
 everyone else (who is "taxed" for this
 purpose).
 Fourth, the distribution of income is
 calculated from labor and property income
 before family accumulation (or disaccumu-
 lation) takes place. This procedure omits a
 source making for greater income in-
 equality, namely the income accruing to
 owners of recently accumulated wealth.
 In the model presented above, this should
 not make very much difference; but in
 more complicated models, this factor must
 be taken into consideration. On a more
 general level, the simulation model is
 based on the assumption that capital ac-
 cumulation for the entire society occurs
 through the net addition to inherited pro-
 ductive capital by various families in the
 system. An alternative method for achiev-
 where Y= total personal income; P = property income;
 W=work income i=return on wealth; k=wealth;
 Var( Y) = variance of Y; Cov(i, k) = covariance between
 i and k; and a bar over a letter indicates an average
 value. In the case discussed in the text, i2 increases,
 Var(k) remains the same, the k2Var(i) factor still re-
 mains zero (since there is no variation in return per unit
 of capital) and the covariance term remains roughly the
 same. Thus the overall variance in property income
 rises and this, in turn, leads to an increase in the vari-
 ance of overall personal income. Certain other puzzling
 phenomena remain, particularly in the data for the
 non-linear savings function; these are due in part to the
 fact that unlike most other simulations in this essay,
 equilibrium was achieved extremely slowly and often by
 the twenty-fifth generation (the cutoff point), this
 equilibrium point had not been reached.
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 ing economic growth that does not involve
 inheritance occurs when claims on produc-
 tive capital are accumulated through part
 of a person's lifetime and then are con-
 verted into consumption by the end of the
 person's life. If generations overlap and if
 the maximum accumulated wealth is
 greater for each succeeding generation,
 then societal capital accumulation could
 occur without any inheritances.'3 Although
 such extreme a situation does not seem
 very likely, such a process may be oc-
 curring in part and the equilibrium income
 results of the simulation model would have
 a further bias toward equality. T his factor
 could be incorporated into the model, but
 considerably more memory space in the
 computer would be required.
 Fifth, in the simulation model factor in-
 comes are distributed according to the
 marginal productivity theory. T his is not,
 however, a crucial aspect of the model
 since by substituting different coefficients
 in the production function one can easily
 change the share of income received for the
 services of labor and capital. Although I
 have not considered any interactions be-
 tween relative factor shares and some of
 the other parameters of the system (on the
 grounds that no convincing evidence of
 such a relationship has been found), such
 an effect could easily be incorporated into
 the simulation.'4
 Sixth, the model is allowed to run to
 equilibrium which, in many cases, takes
 twenty or so generations. Much more use-
 ful for policy purposes would be examina-
 tion of situations where, starting with the
 current size distribution of income and
 wealth, the model were allowed to run only
 for several generations. TIhe purpose of
 letting equilibrium be achieved is to give
 some general results about the direction of
 change that may be of use to analysts
 facing many different size distributions of
 income and wealth.
 Seventh and finally, our knowledge
 about the actual parameters of the system
 that would influence the equilibrium size
 distribution of income and wealth is quite
 limited. Most importantly, we have no
 statistical idea about the shape of the inter-
 generational savings function which proves
 such a critical factor in determining the
 final equilibrium positions. We do not
 know the relative importance of more com-
 plicatecl inheritance arrangements where
 wealth is passed two generations away
 through particular types of trust arrange-
 ments. Our quantitative notions about
 marriage patterns and inheritance rules
 may be greater, but such matters still need
 considerable quantitative analysis before
 parameters can be derived for use in the
 model. Except for some imaginative work
 by Robert Summers, little work has been
 done on calculating lifetime size distribu-
 tions of income.'5 Ihus, even if the simula-
 tion model were more sophisticated, we
 would not have the requisite knowledge of
 the proper parametrs for running the
 model for predictive purposes.
 VI. Some Speculations
 Although the simple simulation model
 has some obvious shortcomings and must
 be viewed as a starting point for more
 sophisticated models, the results obtained
 point toward a number of factors neglected
 by economists interested in the size dis-
 tribution of income. Aloreover, the results
 permit several different answers to some
 puzzling questions regarding changes in
 the degree of inequality of the size distribu-
 tion of income over time.
 Among Western non-Marxist econo-
 mists there seems to be some agreement
 that the distributions of income and wealth
 13 Such a situation is explored l)y James 'IIobin.
 14 I would like to thank Steven Resnick for his ideas
 on this theme.
 15 Lifetime income distributions in the United States
 are estimated bv Summers. I would like to thank him
 for sending me a copy of this extremely useful study.
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 of nations become increasingly unequal
 during the early stages of the development
 process but that after the development
 process is well underway, this distribu-
 tional tendency is reversed and the in-
 come distribution becomes increasingly
 more equal. Certain empirical evidence
 supports this proposition. For instance, in
 the United States estimates of the distri-
 bution of wealth show an increasing in-
 equality throughout the ninteenth cen-
 tury, reaching a high point at the turn of
 the century. Since then, however, these
 data show that the inequality of wealth
 holding has declined so that the Gini co-
 efficient of wealth inequality was roughly
 the same in 1962 as in 1860.16 In this
 century the inequality of personal wealth
 holdings appears to have decreased in the
 United Kingdom as well."7 Finally, income
 inecquality has decreased in a great many
 developed nations in the last 30 to 60
 years and there appears to be an inverse
 relationship in the WTest between the level
 of development and the Gini coefficient of
 income inequality on both a time-series
 and a cross-section basis.18 A number of
 theoretical arguments concerning the
 causes of such shifts in the distribution of
 income have been offered"9 and in this
 digression I would like to add one addi-
 tional explanation based on the simulation
 results above.
 In a highly underdeveloped nation the
 major source of wealth is land; inheri-
 tances consist primarily of intergenera-
 tional transfers of a fixed amount of land;
 and the equilibrium distribution of income
 in such a case is described in Section II. As
 industrialization begins and accunmulated
 industrial capital becomes an important
 source of wealth, it seems likely that the
 intergenerational transfer function ap-
 proaches the non-linear form described
 in Section III. T his is because the biologi-
 cal level of subsistence is still a substantial
 proportion of average income an(l it is
 unlikely that people with relatively low
 incomes could pass on a very significant
 proportion of their lifetime income to their
 heirs. As per capita income rises, this
 biological subsistence income becomes an
 increasingly smaller share of average in-
 comes and it seems likely that the income
 level below which no intergenerational
 transfers take place does not rise as fast as
 average income. If so, then the non-linear
 intergenerational transfer function asymp-
 totically approaches the linear case.
 In such a situation, three stages in the
 distribution of wealth and income can be
 distinguished: a stagnant stage in which
 the distribution of wealth and income re-
 main relatively constant; the initial stages
 of industrialization in which the distribu-
 tion of wealth and income become increas-
 ingly more unequal (under the impact of a
 non-linear intergenerational savings func-
 tion); and a later stage of industrialization
 in which the distribution of wealth and
 income become more equal when the inter-
 generational transfer function becomes
 more linear.
 Since we know very little about inter-
 generational transfers at any stage of de-
 velopment, this scenario of developmenit
 16 For relevant data see Lee Soltow, Robert Lamp-
 man, and James Smith.
 17 Data are presented by Lampman, p. 214.
 18 The four most extensive recent international com-
 parisons of the size distribution of income are by Simon
 Kuznets, Irving Kravis, Harold Lydall (who only
 covers labor income), and Richard Weisskoff.
 19 Kuznets (1955) focuses on the shift from rural to
 urban areas as the most important casual factor. (This
 model is investigated more throughlv on a theoretical
 level by Henri Theil, and on an empirical level by
 Weisskoff.) Stiglitz bases an explanation for the same
 phenomenon on the relationship in the process of
 economic growth of the starting point to the equilibrium
 production level. R. Albert Berry focuses on unemploy-
 ment and changes in particular market imperfections.
 Others have focused on more politcal factors such as the
 increase of political mobilization accompanying eco-
 nomic development that leads to greater progressive
 redistribution of income and wealth by the government
 after a particular point of development.
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 must remain speculative; nevertheless, it
 does provide a focus for future empirical
 research.
 VII. Two General Conclusions
 A great many different cases have been
 discussed, and these are but a small frac-
 tion of the possible cases that can be gen-
 erated by the model. Nevertheless. two
 general conclusions can be drawn:
 First, for a general theory of the size
 distribution of income, we must take into
 account the influence of the size distribu-
 tion of wealth; and this means we must bring
 into the analysis a number of important
 social and economic variables such as the
 pattern of intergeneratioinal transfers of
 income anid wealth, the rules of inheritance
 in the society, and differential patterns of
 fertility of income classes. It is impossible
 to generalize about long-run changes in the
 size distribution of income and wealth in
 capitalism without specifying many more
 variables than economists have usually
 done. Blanket predictions about increasing
 concentration of income and wealth, for
 example, the orthodox Marxist analysis of
 such problems, implicitly make too many
 vital assumptions to be of much use.
 Second, the simulation model presente(d
 in this paper provides a starting point for
 such a broader type of analysis of the
 distribution of income and wealth. In order
 to bring the analysis closer to actual situa-
 tions in particular countries, much more
 empirical and theoretical work needs to be
 done. On the theoretical side, we need to
 consider many more complications than
 those presented in this essay; on the
 empirical side we need to have a much
 clearer picture of the critical parameters.
 The model does, however, point to one
 extremely important factor-the shape of
 the intergenerational savings function-
 which has been neglected by previous
 analysts and which I hope to have dem-
 onstrated is critical in predicting changes
 in the size distribution of income and
 wealth.
 APPENDIX
 Determiniation of the Speed of Conv,ergence to
 an Equilibrim Income Distribution
 Due to the influence of random factors in
 the inheritance-marriage simulation pro-
 gram, the generated income distribution does
 not completely converge to a singleincome
 distribution, but rather to a band of inconme
 distributions around the equilibrium. A numi-
 ber of curve-fitting methods were attemnpted
 in order to derive the equilibrium distribu-
 tion but these proved unsatisfactory and the
 following alternative method was adopted.
 This is a mlodification of a method suggested
 by Richard N. Cooper, to whomii I would like
 to express my thanks.
 First, an unweighted average and standard
 deviation of the Gini coefficient of income
 equality were calculated for the last five
 generations in the thirtNv-generation simula-
 tion. The sixth to last Gini coefficient was
 then tested to see if it fell within the .95
 confidence limit of the calculated average.
 If this was the case, then the unweighted
 average and standard deviation were recalcu-
 lated to include this datum and the next
 Gini coefficient was examined in a like man-
 ner. This process was stopped wheni the
 examined coefficient did not nmeet the test;
 the number of generations was then deter-
 mined, and average coefficient for the other
 indicators of inequality (for example, the
 standard deviation of the logarithms of in-
 come, the share of income accounted for by
 the top 10 percent, etc.) were recorded.
 Then, with the calculated standard devia-
 tion of the Gini coefficient from the above
 process, I started from the first generation
 to see at what generation the Gini coefficient
 had a significant chance of belonging to the
 calculated equilibrium. When this point was
 reached, the generation number was re-
 corded. The conversion point was considered
 to lie between this point and the earliest
 generation to be included in the calculation
 outlined in the first step.
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 Such a procedure is based on the assump-
 tion that the income distribution converges
 by and large within thirty generations.
 Whether such a convergence occurred at all
 was determined by visual inspection of the
 entire series of calculated Gini coefficients.
 APPENDIX TAB3LE 1--GINI COEFFICIENTS oF EQUJLII3RIUM INCOME D)ISTR11RUTIONS
 ASSUMING DIFFERENTIAL F ERTILITY RATES"
 Marriage Rules
 No-Choice Limited-Choice Equal-Choice
 Number of childrena
 Rich M.C. Poor
 2 2 2
 Primogeniture .307 .308 .297
 Compromise 1) .064 .060
 Equal division t, .064 .060
 3 2 1
 Primogeniture .309 .309 .306
 Compromise .075 .074 .076
 Equal division .074 .069 .074
 l 2 3
 Primogeniture .308 .308 .298
 Compromise .303 .304 .301
 Equal division .308 .300 .295
 1 3 1
 I'rimogeniture .310 .306 .300
 Compromise .306 .305 .295
 Equal division .308 .302 .295
 3 1 3
 Primogeniture .310 .306 .303
 Compromise . 168 .160 .135
 Equal division .168 .158 .130
 Assitmptions: No net family capital formation; no capital or income redistributions;
 standard deviation of random element is. 15; labor share of national income is 75 percent.
 a The poor are those 25 percent of families with the lowest income; the rich are those 25
 percent of families with the highest incomes.
 b If the system starts from a highly unequal distribution of wealth, the equilibrium
 distribution of income is equal to its original value. If the system starts from a relatively
 equal wealth distribution where high ability people with no property might marry low
 ability with property (since they would be next to each other on the income scale), then
 the equilibrium income distribution would be highly equal.
 A Gini coefficient of zero represents total equality; a coefficient of unity represents
 total inequality.
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 APPENDIx TABLE 2-EQUILIBRIUM GROSs NATIONAL PRODUCTS WITH COBI3-DOUGLAS PRODUCTION
 F"UNCTIONS AND DIFFERENTIAL SAVINGS FUNCTIONSa
 Marriage rules
 No-choice Limited choice Equal choice
 Inheritance rules
 Equal Equal Equal
 Primogeniture division Primogeniture division Primogeniture division
 S= Yz: any income or capital redistribution
 z= I.5 114 114 114 114 114 114
 z=2.0 126 126 126 126 126 126
 z = 2.5 136 136 136 136 136 136
 S (Y- Y)z
 No redistributions
 z=2.0 79 78 79 75 79 71
 z = 2.5 85 84 85 79 85 73
 z=2.0, income redistributions of R percent
 R=0.0% 79 78 79 75 79 71
 R=30.0 70 69 70 65 70 57
 R=60.0 58 5 7 58 55 58 47
 R=90.0 37 36 37 34 37 31
 z=2.0, capital redistributions of R percent
 R = 0. 0% 79 78 79 75 79 71
 R=30.0 70 70 70 66 70 58
 R = 60.0 58 58 58 54 58 52
 R=90.0 47 48 49 48 47 47
 Assuniptions: All familes have two children; standard deviation of random element is .15; labor share of national
 income is 75 percent; no negative saving; no technical change.
 Notes: S=personal savings; Y=personal income; Y=average income; z=a constant.
 a For the equilibrium GNP using the non-linear saving function, production at the 30th generation was used as the
 equilibrium value.
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 APPENDIX TABLE 3 GINI COEFFICIENTS OF EQUILIBRIUM INCOME DISTRIBUTION
 WITH DIFFERENT PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS
 Marriage Rules
 Production functions, transfer
 and inheritance rules No-Choice Limited-Choice Equal-Choice
 S= Yz, (z= 2.0)
 CES, s = 1.5
 Primogeniture .208 .208 .200
 Equal division .061 .060 .059
 Cobb-Douglas
 Primogeniture .167 .169 .162
 Equal division .066 .066 .063
 CES, s=0.5
 Primogeniture .102 .101 .102
 Equal division .079 .076 .074
 S=(Y-Y)z, (z=2.0)
 CES, s= 1.5
 Primogeniture .234 .233 .237
 Equal division .220 .188 .117
 Cobb-Douglas
 Primogeniture .306 .301 .300
 Equal division .293 .266 .206
 CE S, s = 0.5
 Primogeniture .404 .402 .405
 Equal division .400 .377 .327
 Assuznptions: All familes have two children; standard deviation of random element is
 .15; no technological change; no income or capital redistribution; no negative transfers.
 Notes: S=intergenerational transfers; Y=personal income; Y=average income;
 z=constant; L=labor force; K=capital stock; P=total production; b=a constant;
 s = elasticity of substitution.
 Production functions: Cobb-Douglas: P =L.75K 2
 CES: P=[.75L-+.25K 1]-Ib, where b=(1/s)-1
 APPENDIX TABLE 4 EQUILIBRIUM GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCTS WITH DIFFERENT
 PRODUCTION IJUNCTIONSa
 Marriage rules
 No-choice Limited-choice Equal-choice
 Inheritance rules
 Production Equal Equal Equal
 functions Primogeniture division Primogeniture division Primogeniture division
 S = Yz, (z = 2.0)
 CElS, s = 1. 5 131 131 131 131 131 131
 Cobb-Douglas 126 126 126 126 126 126
 CES, s=0.5 117 117 117 117 117 117
 S=(Y-Y)z, (z=2.0)
 Cl.S, s = 1. 5 75 74 75 72 75 67
 Cobb-Douglas 79 78 79 75 79 71
 CES, s=0.5 86 85 86 82 86 73
 Assumnitptions: All families have two children; standard deviation of random element is .15; no negative savings;
 no technical change; no capital or income redistributions.
 Notes: S= personal savings; Y=personal income; Y =average income; z=a constant; s=elasticity of substitution.
 a See fn. a, Appendix Table 2.
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 APPENDIX TABLE 5 GINI COEFFICIENTS OF EQUILIBRIUM INCOME DISTRIBUTION
 WITH HARROD-NEUTRAL TECHNICAL CHANGE
 Marriage Rules
 Transfer functions and
 inheritance rules No-Choice Limited-Choice Equal-Choice
 S=Yz, (z=2.0) No technical change
 Primogeniture .167 .169 .162
 Equal division .066 .066 .063
 Technical change= 10% per generation
 Primogeniture .165 .165 .161
 Equal division .069 .067 .060
 Technical change=20% per generation
 Primogeniture .165 .165 .161
 Equal division .069 .067 .060
 S=(Y-Y)z, (z=2.0) No technical change
 Primogeniture .306 .301 .300
 Equal division .293 .266 .206
 Technical change= =100C, per generation
 Primogeniture .308 .305 .309
 Equal division .300 .253 .190
 Technical change = 20% per generation
 Primogeniture .308 .305 .309
 Equal division .300 .253 .191
 Assiumptions: All families have two children; standard deviation of random element is .15; labor share of national.
 income is 75 percent; no income or capital redistribution; no negative savings.
 Notes: S = intergenerational transfers; Y = personal income; Y = average income; z = a constant.
 APPENDIX TABLE 6-EQUILIBRIUM GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCTS WITH DIFFERENT IERTILITY
 RATES AND POPULATION GROWTHa
 Marriage rules
 No-choice Limited-choice Equal-choice
 Inheritance rules
 Fertility Primo- Compro- Equal Primo- Compro- Equal Primo- Compro- Equal
 Patterns geniture mise division geniture mise division geniture mise division
 Number of children S = Yz, (z= 2 .0)
 Rich M.C. Poor
 3 2 2 535 535 535 535 535 535 535 535 535
 2 2 2 535 535 535 535 535 535 535 535 535
 S=(Y-Y)z, (z=2.0)
 3 2 2 337 314 298 336 309 281 336 271. 252
 2 2 2 337 335 335 336 331 328 336 282 288
 Assoozitptions: Standard deviation of random element is . 15; Cobb-Douglas production function with labor share of
 national income is 75 percent; no technological change; no income or capital redistribution; no negative savings; rich
 and poor are top and bottom 20 percent of income distribution, respectively.
 Basic parameters: 50 familes, 25 generation
 Abbreviations: S = personal savings; Y = personal income; Y = average income; z = a constant
 a For the equilibrium GNP production at the 25th generation was used as the equilibrium value.
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